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IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF FULTON COUNTY
STATE OF GEORGIA

THOMAS COLLENTINE, JR., et aI..,
Plaintiff,
v.
MORGAN STANLEY & CO., INC., et aI.,
Defendants.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Civil Action File No.
2012CV214140

ORDER ON PLAINTIFFS' MOTIONS TO COMPEL

Before this Court are two ' Motions to Compel: Plaintiffs' Motion to Compel Documents
from Defendant Goldman, Sachs & Co. ("Goldman") and Plaintiffs' Motion to Compel
Documents from Defendant Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith Incorporated ("Merrill
Lynch"). The parties, through several meet and confer discussions, have limited the scope of the
documents requested and agreed on many issues. The final issue remaining in these motions is
whether Plaintiffs may seek to compel production of documents from non-party affiliates of
Defendants: Merrill Lynch Professional Clearing Corp. ("MLPRO") (an affiliate of Merrill
Lynch) and Goldman Sachs Execution & Clearing, L.P. ("GSEC") and Goldman Sachs
International ("GSIL") (affiliates of Goldman) (collectively, "Affiliates"). The facts of the case
have been laid out in prior orders of the Court, including the Court's Order on Defendants'
Motion to Dismiss filed contemporaneously with this Order and will not be repeated here.

I Plaintiffs' Motion to Compel Documents from Defendant Morgan Stanley & Co., Inc. and Plaintiffs'
Motion to Compel Documents from Defendant UBS Securities, LLC are moot as UBS and Morgan
Stanley have represented to the Court that they have resolved all issues with Plaintiffs.
1

"Parties may obtain discovery regarding any matter, not privileged, which is relevant to
the subject matter involved in the pending action ... It is not ground for objection that the

information sought will be inadmissible at the trial if the information sought appears to be
reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence." O.C.G.A. § 9-1126(b)(1). In defining relevancy, the Supreme COUli of Georgia recently stated, "in the discovery
context, courts should and ordinarily do interpret 'relevant' very broadly to mean any matter that
is relevant to anything that is or may become 8.11 issue in litigation." Bowden v. Medical Center,
Inc., 773 S.E. 2d 692, 696 (2015) (quoting Oppenheimer Fund, Inc. v. Sanders, 437 U.S. 340,

351 n. 12 (1978)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Plaintiffs have requested Trading Records held by each of the Affiliates reflecting the
selling and lending transactions involving Raser stock. According to the July 27, 2015 Affidavit
of John D'Ercole, one of Plaintiffs' attorneys, the "Trading Records" sought include:
FROM MERRILL: (1) Blue Sheets or Equivalent Trading Data, the Stock Record, and
the Journal Record for MLPRO and MUL2 and (2) complete stock loan data for Merrill,
MLPRO, and MUL and the "Hard to Borrow List," "Good to Borrow List," "Easy to Borrow
List," or equivalent information in its possession, custody and/or control, for Raser stock.
FROM GOLDMAN: (1) Blue Sheets or Equivalent Trading Data, the Stock Record, and
the Journal Record for GSEC and GSIL and (2) complete stock borrow and loan data for
Goldman, GSEC and GSIL.

2 Plaintiffs initially sought documents from a second Merrill Lynch affiliate, Merrill Lynch International
("MLIL") but they have resolved this dispute in meet and confer discussions.
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Plaintiffs allege that Defendants used these Affiliates to bOlTOW stocks to lend to its U.S.
customers to close out short positions. Plaintiffs argue the Affiliates' Trading Records are
relevant to establishing Defendants' liability and Plaintiffs' damages and have presented an
Affidavit and Reply Affidavit from Michael Rosen, a securities trading analyst retained by the
Plaintiffs explaining how these requested documents are critical to establish stock manipulation.

I. Merrill Lynch and MLPRO
Plaintiffs argue MLPRO is wholly owned and controlled by Merrill Lynch and is
inextricably intertwined in Merrill's trading activities concerning Raser stock. Merrill Lynch
and MLPRO were linked through an Intercompany Settlement Process ("ISP") which allowed
MLPRO to transfer its settlement and clearance obligations to Merrill Lynch. In 2014, FINRA
found that these transfers violated the close-out requirements of Regulation SHOo Merrill Lynch
included financial results of MLPRO in its "Consolidated Financial Statements" publicly filed
with the SEC. Plaintiffs argue many of the transactions between Merrill and MLPRO were
accomplished through intercompany journal entries and not actual trading. Specifically,
Plaintiffs allege MLPRO hid its short positions in Merrill's books for 1,271,248 shares of Raser
stock through journal entries without any actual selling activity. While Plaintiffshave gotten
records from one side of certain transactions-trades executed through Merrill Lynch-they
have not gotten trading records when Merrill Lynch was not the executing broker or was the
contra party to the securities transaction with Merrill Lynch, or when MLPRO engaged in a stock
or loan transaction with Goldman, Morgan Stanley, or UBS. Plaintiffs assert that MLPRO
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docwnents will serve as an important cross-check for data they have already obtained from
Merrill Lynch.
In response, Merrill Lynch first notes that Plaintiffs subpoenaed records directly from
MLPRO in New York where it is headquartered back in 2013. MLPRO objected on relevance,
privacy, and other grounds. Instead of challenging those objections to the subpoena in New
York, Plaintiffs are seeking these records indirectly through Merrill Lynch. Merrill Lynch
further argues the Affiliates are separate corporate entities with separate businesses and separate
client bases, and that there are no allegations of wrongdoing against the Affiliates in this action.
MLPRO is registered as a separate broker-dealer with the SEC and provides its own responses to
inquiries from the SEC. Merrill Lynch acknowledges that it has provided settlement and
securities lending services to MLPRO but asserts that these practices were conducted under a
clearing agreement and not as a result of any overlap between the entities' operations. They
argue that Rosen says nothing about how MLPRO records will help evaluate Merrill Lynch's

conduct, particularly since Merrill Lynch has already provided Plaintiffs with complete records
of all the intercompany transactions. They also argue Rosen misinterpreted Merrill Lynch's
trade data and that the data provided does not show any wrongdoing by MLPRO such as failure
to deliver Raser shares ("naked short selling"), but only shows that MLPRO was short selling
Raser stock. Thus, Merrill Lynch asserts this request for documents is an impermissible fishing
expedition. Merrill Lynch asserts it has already produced documents showing any intercompany
transactions involving Raser securities, but has not produced MLPRO client trading and position
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data. Merrill Lynch argues MLPRO's individual clients' privacy interests outweigh Plaintiffs'
need for this information.
While Plaintiffs could have filed a motion to compel responses in accordance with their
MLPRO subpoena in New York, Merrill Lynch cites no authority that prohibits Plaintiffs from
seeking relevant documents in Merrill Lynch's custody and control. While Merrill Lynch argues
it and MLPRO are separate companies, it does not argue MLPRO's Trading Records are not
within its custody or control. See O.C.G.A § 9-11-34(a)(1)

(allowing a party to request any

designated documents "which are in the possession, custody, or control of the party upon whom
the request is served.").

Nor does it argue that the production ofMLPRO's documents would be

unduly burdensome.
The Court has weighed the potential relevance of the MLPRO Trading Records against
non-party MLPRO's right to privacy and the privacy rights of its clients. See S. Outdoor
Promotions v. Nat 'I Banner Co., 215 Ga App 133, 134 (1994) (finding appellant's right to
privacy substantially outweighs the de minimis relevancy of discovery request for IRS
documents); Borenstein v. Blumenfeld, 151 Ga App. 420, 421 (1979) ("the competing interest in
an individual's right to privacy must be accommodated in the discovery process" and interests of
judgment do not require production of financial document when there are other discovery
methods available to get the same information).

Merrill Lynch, the sole Merrill Lynch entity

named in this suit, has provided its Trading Records for Raser stock transactions, but Plaintiffs
seek to cross-check Merrill Lynch's Trading Records with those ofMLPRO and piece together
the entire trading history. The Court agrees that any privacy concerns in keeping MLPRO's and
5
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MLPRO's clients' financial and trading information private are protected under the Protective
Order dated June 17,2013. For that reason, Plaintiffs' Motion to Compel Documents from
Defendant Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith Incorporated is GRANTED.

II. Goldman, GSEC, and GSIL
Plaintiffs argue GSEC and GSIL are inextricably intertwined in Goldman's trading
activities. Goldman purportedly centralizes all its stock borrow functions under one centralized
stock loan/borrow desk that services both OSEC and OSIL. Plaintiffs argue Goldman has the
ability to request the documents from GSEC and OSIL because they are all owned by the same
parent, share operational systems, and report their financial results on a consolidated basis.
Plaintiffs contend Goldman and OSEC share the same electronic trading platform and OSEC's
trading records of its clients are available to Goldman through this platform. See Lion Antique
Cars & Investments, Inc. v. Tafel, 332 Oa. App. 824,826

(2015), cert. denied (Oct. 5,2015)

(upholding trial court's order for corporation to produce documents possessed by a separate
company because "there was also evidence of a close, longstanding relationship" between
corporation's president and separate company and corporation was subsequently able to obtain
some of the documents from the separate company, which shows some measure of control over
the documents, despite the fact that the documents were in the separate company's possession).
According to Plaintiffs, the GSEC and GSIL documents are relevant because GSEC is
involved as a borrower and lender of Raser stock to Goldman to cover short positions and
records show GSIL lending stock to Goldman. Plaintiffs argue the Trading Records supplied by
Goldman are insufficient for the same reason the Merrill Lynch trading records are-they do not
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reflect the contra side of the securities transaction or where Goldman was not the executing
broker thus making it impossible to piece together the full inter-company trading relationship
between Goldman and its Affiliates.
Unlike Merrill Lynch, Goldman expressly states that GSIL and GSEC's documents are
not within Goldman's possession, custody, or control.

See O.C.G.A

§ 9-11-34(a)(1).

Goldman

responds that GSEC and GSIL are not wholly owned subsidiaries of Goldman, but are "sister"
corporations sharing a common corporate parent, The Goldman Sachs Group, Inc. It argues that
Plaintiffs have failed to show that Goldman "controls" its sister corporations such that GSEC and
GSIL are alter egos or agents of Goldman.

Goldman relies on federal cases that have found that

a sister company did not have "control" over another sister company. See, e.g., Pennwalt Corp.
v. Plough, Inc., 85 F.R.D. 257, 263 (D. Del. 1979) (noting that corporate litigants have been
required to produce documents from separate corporate entities, most commonly when parent
corporation must produce documents of wholly owned subsidiary, but finding that a company
with different legal and commercial interests at stake should not have its rights determined in
absentia unless the companies are so intertwined as to render meaningless their separate
corporate entities).

Plaintiffs served a subpoena in New York in January of2014 seeking

documents from non-party GSEC, and filed a motion for Letters Rogatory in the United
Kingdom in May of2014

in order to obtain documents from GSIC, a United Kingdom

corporation. Instead of challenging those objections to the subpoena in New York or the UK,
Plaintiffs are seeking these records indirectly through Goldman.

According to Goldman, the

motion filed in the UK was withdrawn. Further, there are no allegations of naked short selling
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against the Affiliates in this action and Goldman argues that all short selling of Raser stock
would be reflected in the Goldman Trading Records already produced. Finally, Goldman, like
Merrill Lynch, argues that third parties' privacy interests outweigh any possible relevance.
To the extent the GSIL and GSEC documents are in Goldman's control by virtue of the
consolidated operations, most notably, the trading platform, the Court finds that Goldman has a
duty to produce the documents requested from GSEC and GSIL under Georgia law. Further, as
discussed above, since Plaintiffs allege Goldman used its Affiliates to hide its naked short
selling, the records are likely to lead to the discovery of relevant information. Finally, the Court
does not believe that the potential relevance is outweighed by privacy concerns. The documents
are subject to the Court's Protective Order, discussed above. Further, the COUli does not believe
the privacy concerns are heightened when a foreign company's Trading Records are being
sought, particularly when the Trading Records are for securities held in a u.s. Company, traded
in the U.S. market, and are being sought from a U.S. corporation. Therefore, Plaintiffs' Motion
to Compel Documents from Defendant Goldman, Sachs & Co. is GRANTED.

SO ORDERED

this

-+

day of April, 2016

Su eri
Iton County
Atlanta Judicial Circuit
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A.ttorneys for Plaintiffs

Attorneys for Defendants

Joe E. Luce
James W. Christian
CHRISTIAN, SMITH, & JEWELL, LLP
2302 Fannin, Suite 500
Houston, Texas 77002
Tel: (713) 659-7616
Fax: (713) 659-7641
jluce@csj-Iaw.com
jchristian@csj-Iaw.com

Richard H. Sinkfield
Dan F. Laney
ROGERS & HARDIN LLP
2700 International Tower
Peachtree Center
2299 Peachtree Street, N.W.
Atlanta, Georgia 30303
rsinkfield@rh-law.col11
d laney@rh-Iaw.com

Jimmy L. Paul
David N. Dreyer
Scott Michael Ratchick
Drew V. Greene
CHAMBERLAIN, HRDLICKA, WHITE,
WILLIAMS & AUGHTRY
191 Peachtree Street, N .E.
341h Floor
Atlanta, Georgia 30303
jimmy.paul@chamberlainlaw.com
david.dreyer@chamberlainlaw.com
scott.ratchick@chamberlainlaw.com
drew.greene@chamberlainlaw.com

Attorneys for Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner &
Smith Incorporated
Andrew J. Frackman
Abby F. Rudzin
Brad M. Elias
O'MELVENY & MYERS LLP
Times Square Tower
7 Times Square
New York, New York 10036
afrackman@omm.com
arudzin@omm.com
belias@omm.com

Attorneys for Goldman, Sachs & Co. LLC
Richard C. Pepperman, n
John G. McCarthy
SULLIV AN & CROMWELL LLP
125 Broad Street
New York, New York 10004
QeQ12ermanr@sullcrom.com
mccarthyj@sullcrom.com

Alam M. Pollack
John D. D'Ercole
ROBINSON BROG LEINW AND GREENE
GENOVESE & GLUCK, P.c.
875 Third Avenue, 91h Floor
New York, New York 10022
amQ@robinsonbrog.com
jdd@robinsonbrog.com

Attorneys for Morgan Stanley & Co. LLC
Jami Johnson
Robert F. Wise, Jr.
Stefani L. Johnson
DA VIS POLK & WARDWELL LLP
450 Lexington A venue
9
Collentine., et af. v. Morgan Stanley & Co, LLC, et al., CAFN 20 12CV214140; Order on Plaintiffs' Motions to
Compel

New York, New York 10017
jami.johnson@davispolk.com
robert. wise@davispolk.com
stefani. johnson@davispolk.com

Attorneysfor UBS Securities, LLC
Jeffrey M. Gould
Beth A. Williams
Stephen S. Schwartz
KIRKLAND & ELLIS LLP
655 Fifteenth Street, NW
Suite 1200
Washington DC 20005
jeffrey.gould@kirkland.com
beth. wi II iams@kirkland.com
stephen.schwaI1z@kirkland.com
Andrew B. Clubok
KIRKLAND & ELLIS LLP
601 Lexington Avenue
New York, New York 10022-4611
andrew.clubokcakirkland.com
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